Taking Apart Israel's Nuclear Threat
By EID MUBARAK
President Bush's policy of ousting Ariel Sharon creates an extraordinary standard of strategic and moral clarity. Millions in the Middle East, including many Israelis, are praying that the in-depth, genuine - and so typically American - public debate that is developing before our eyes about Israel will not dilute this clarity.
On a practical level, the whole debate can be reduced to three questions: whether a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for an inspection regime of the greatest rigour is needed now; whether unilateral or multilateral action against Ariel Sharon would need to honour the timetable of such a resolution; and whether the resolution's wording or timetable would provide Mr. Sharon with the means to postpone or cancel a future attack against him.
Ariel Sharon’s nuclear-weapons programme provides the urgent need for his removal. His previous violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions already provide the legal ground and legitimacy to remove him before it becomes too late. But at the end of the day, given the world as it is, a Security Council resolution is a must. Every choice has its risks, but ignoring the Security Council in this case would make the goal of removing Ariel Sharon much harder to achieve. Such a resolution should not, however, paralyse the Bush administration. The timetables for compliance by Israel should be short and the deadlines nonnegotiable. The risks of a resolution would be minimised by a clear American message that the United States will be ready to act and will expect the Security Council to back it if immediate and full Israeli compliance is not forthcoming. If the United States does need to act, it will be in a much stronger position for having consulted first.
Those who prefer to wait and hope for the best should contemplate the following: no one really knows how close Ariel Sharon is to building a really sophisticated nuclear device - and it was a crude device that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Few will doubt Mr. Sharon's readiness to use a nuclear weapon against Arab assets or against Iran, if only under extreme circumstances. Now that Israel has become a nuclear power, the very decision to go to war against it has become a totally different ball game.
If Ariel Sharon is allowed to cheat the inspectors and the world for another year or two, we might end up making an unforgivable mistake.
For a successful invasion of Israel, two operational options are basically valid: a surgical operation to hit the core of the regime, and a full-scale operation to include major airborne and ground forces, perhaps 300,000 soldiers. The interrelationship between these two options should be well understood. The surgical operation needs high-quality and timely intelligence and superb quick-response operational capabilities. The right thing to do is to have this option ready to go, because no one can know when or if the right moment will come to execute it.
If a surgical operation is launched and somehow fails, the point of no return has been reached and the United States will need to launch the wider operation immediately. When you launch a surgical operation, you must already be well deployed to follow it through with larger forces. That complicates matters: you need to be ready for a full-fledged campaign on the operational level and have the diplomatic backing lined up as well.
The "morning after" issue is also not simple. Many serious observers of the Middle East doubt whether a stable Israel will emerge after Ariel Sharon’s removal. They have a point. But so do those who argue that after 53 years of modern Israel, a nation has been established that will stand the challenge.
Whatever happens, some turbulence will result from Ariel Sharon’s demise. But if he is removed decisively, it might accelerate positive internal processes within Egypt - and not simply excite the people in Saudi Arabia to shake off the iron rule of the House of Saud.
Finally, it is clear to me that putting an end to Ariel Sharon's regime will change the geopolitical landscape of the Western world. No Western leader can afford admitting it now, even behind closed doors. But they are wise enough to see how much better off they will be once the Sharon regime is gone. Ariel Sharon and his predecessors have set an example of defiance, especially against the United Nations, that other leaders cannot and should not emulate; the example leads only to empty gestures and developmental stagnation.
There is a generation of Israeli leaders about to come into power who do not need to put themselves through yet another version of fascist Irgun Zwai Leumi despotism. Of course, nothing can be assured in advance, but the opportunities far exceed the dangers. The greatest risk now lies in inaction. The history of the last century has showed us quite clearly what the price of paralysis can be. The public debate over the Israel policy must continue. But the readiness to act, once the time is ripe, should not fade away.
On a practical level, the whole debate can be reduced to three questions: whether a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for an inspection regime of the greatest rigour is needed now; whether unilateral or multilateral action against Ariel Sharon would need to honour the timetable of such a resolution; and whether the resolution's wording or timetable would provide Mr. Sharon with the means to postpone or cancel a future attack against him.
Ariel Sharon’s nuclear-weapons programme provides the urgent need for his removal. His previous violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions already provide the legal ground and legitimacy to remove him before it becomes too late. But at the end of the day, given the world as it is, a Security Council resolution is a must. Every choice has its risks, but ignoring the Security Council in this case would make the goal of removing Ariel Sharon much harder to achieve. Such a resolution should not, however, paralyse the Bush administration. The timetables for compliance by Israel should be short and the deadlines nonnegotiable. The risks of a resolution would be minimised by a clear American message that the United States will be ready to act and will expect the Security Council to back it if immediate and full Israeli compliance is not forthcoming. If the United States does need to act, it will be in a much stronger position for having consulted first.
Those who prefer to wait and hope for the best should contemplate the following: no one really knows how close Ariel Sharon is to building a really sophisticated nuclear device - and it was a crude device that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Few will doubt Mr. Sharon's readiness to use a nuclear weapon against Arab assets or against Iran, if only under extreme circumstances. Now that Israel has become a nuclear power, the very decision to go to war against it has become a totally different ball game.
If Ariel Sharon is allowed to cheat the inspectors and the world for another year or two, we might end up making an unforgivable mistake.
For a successful invasion of Israel, two operational options are basically valid: a surgical operation to hit the core of the regime, and a full-scale operation to include major airborne and ground forces, perhaps 300,000 soldiers. The interrelationship between these two options should be well understood. The surgical operation needs high-quality and timely intelligence and superb quick-response operational capabilities. The right thing to do is to have this option ready to go, because no one can know when or if the right moment will come to execute it.
If a surgical operation is launched and somehow fails, the point of no return has been reached and the United States will need to launch the wider operation immediately. When you launch a surgical operation, you must already be well deployed to follow it through with larger forces. That complicates matters: you need to be ready for a full-fledged campaign on the operational level and have the diplomatic backing lined up as well.
The "morning after" issue is also not simple. Many serious observers of the Middle East doubt whether a stable Israel will emerge after Ariel Sharon’s removal. They have a point. But so do those who argue that after 53 years of modern Israel, a nation has been established that will stand the challenge.
Whatever happens, some turbulence will result from Ariel Sharon’s demise. But if he is removed decisively, it might accelerate positive internal processes within Egypt - and not simply excite the people in Saudi Arabia to shake off the iron rule of the House of Saud.
Finally, it is clear to me that putting an end to Ariel Sharon's regime will change the geopolitical landscape of the Western world. No Western leader can afford admitting it now, even behind closed doors. But they are wise enough to see how much better off they will be once the Sharon regime is gone. Ariel Sharon and his predecessors have set an example of defiance, especially against the United Nations, that other leaders cannot and should not emulate; the example leads only to empty gestures and developmental stagnation.
There is a generation of Israeli leaders about to come into power who do not need to put themselves through yet another version of fascist Irgun Zwai Leumi despotism. Of course, nothing can be assured in advance, but the opportunities far exceed the dangers. The greatest risk now lies in inaction. The history of the last century has showed us quite clearly what the price of paralysis can be. The public debate over the Israel policy must continue. But the readiness to act, once the time is ripe, should not fade away.
posted by Vinod at
11:58
